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In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration.  
Abundant evidence suggests that allowing labor to move from low-income to high-
income countries would yield substantial gains in global income.  Yet, most high-income 
countries impose strict limits on labor inflows and set their admission policies 
unilaterally.  Making immigration more attractive would require creating mechanisms 
that limit the negative impacts of labor inflows on natives.  Fiscal distortions create an 
incentive for receiving countries to screen immigrants according to their perceived 
economic impact.  For high skilled immigrants, screening can be based on educational 
degrees and professional credentials, which are relatively easy to observe.  For low 
skilled immigrants, illegal immigration represents an imperfect but increasingly common 
screening device.  For policy makers in labor-importing nations, the modest benefits freer 
immigration brings may simply not be worth the political hassle.  To induce high-income 
countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of the bargain. 
 




 When economists discuss the rationale for global trade accords, they generally 
appeal to the benefits of free trade for global economic well being.  By agreeing to keep 
trade barriers against each other low, countries can achieve a higher level of welfare than 
they could by succumbing to the unilateral incentive to improve their terms of trade 
through the application of tariffs.  The belief that the world is better off with multilateral 
trade liberalization than a state of trade war is in part what sustains the world trading 
system in the face of political opposition from special interests. 
 No such logic guides the policies that govern international migration.  Most labor-
importing countries set their admission policies unilaterally, with high-income countries 
imposing strict limits on labor inflows.  Many countries have negotiated bilateral 
agreements on labor movements – the Philippines through its Overseas Employment 
Administration manages agreements on temporary migration flows with a dozen 
countries (International Organization for Migration, 2003) and Spain has immigration 
agreements with at least seven countries (http://www.migrationpolicy.org/) – but 
meaningful migration accords are much more the exception than the rule.1
                                                 
1 While the OECD (2004) identifies the existence of 176 bilateral migration agreements, their practical 
affect appears to be limited.  Most agreements establish a framework for future migration flows rather than 
mechanisms for governing current flows.  The same OECD study recognizes that the vast majority of 
migration flows occur outside of negotiated arrangements. 
  The closest 
source and destination countries have come to negotiating a multilateral deal on 
migration is Mode IV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which 
addresses the temporary movement of “natural persons” in the provision of services 
across borders.  While GATS has been in force since the implementation of the Uruguay 
Round in 1995, its importance for international migration is quite limited. Today, the vast 
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majority of labor flows between countries remain governed by policies that labor 
importing countries design, monitor, and enforce. 
 Were the outcome of the current system an efficient global allocation of labor, 
there would be little to grumble about.  Yet, Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (2008) 
report that for a sample of 42 developing countries the average gain to migrating to the 
United States is an increase in annual earnings of about four times, at purchasing power 
parity.  These gains, which I describe in more detail in section two, reflect enormous 
cross country differences in labor productivity, which three decades of economic 
liberalization by developing countries have been unable to erase. 
 With money seemingly left on the table, it is a puzzle why countries have not 
found a way to facilitate greater global labor mobility.  One question is why labor-
importing countries continue to set immigration policies unilaterally.  The simple answer 
is that when it comes to migration from poor to rich countries importers have all the 
bargaining power.  A core principle underlying the World Trade Organization is 
reciprocity in tariff setting:  by allowing imports into their markets countries secure 
access to markets for their exports.  With international migration between low-income 
and high-income countries, labor flows are rarely bidirectional, making reciprocity moot.  
Whereas migration from high-income to low-income countries accounts for only 3.5% of 
world flows, migration from low-income to high-income is 33.6% of the total (see Table 
1).  The United States stands out for its importance as a destination.  The country is host 
to 19.7% of all international migrants from low-income incomes and 49.5% of migrants 
from low-income countries that reside in high-income countries.  The United States is the 
source country for just 1.2% of the world’s migrants.  Because cross-country differences 
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in income are largely a result of variation in total factor productivity (rather than, say, 
differences in relative factor supplies), rich countries primarily import labor from poor 
countries and poor countries primarily export labor to rich countries (Grogger and 
Hanson, 2008).  The reciprocal market access that poor labor exporters can offer is of 
little value to labor rich importers, leaving them under minimal bilateral pressure to open 
their borders to poor country workers. 
 A more fundamental question is why, even without the lure of reciprocal market 
access, receiving countries do not choose to make their economies more open to foreign 
labor.  In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration 
and how the institutional framework for policy setting translates these motives into policy 
outcomes.  One motivation for barriers to labor inflows is political pressure from groups 
that are hurt by immigration.  If workers opposed to immigration lobby more effectively 
than the business groups that tend to support immigration, policy makers may choose to 
set foreign labor inflows too low, at least from the perspective of maximizing national 
income.  Raising immigration would depend on creating a mechanism to transfer income 
from those that immigration helps to those that it hurts.  In section three, I discuss 
theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of immigration policy. 
A related reason countries restrict immigration is that labor inflows from abroad 
may exacerbate distortions in an economy.  In the presence of redistributive tax and 
transfer policies, immigration, particularly if it is low skilled, may raise the net tax 
burden on native residents.  Native voters may support immigration restrictions as a 
second best response to a welfare system that is hard to reform.  The key to making 
immigration more attractive is creating mechanisms that limit the negative fiscal impacts 
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of labor inflows on natives.  In section four, I discuss how the fiscal impacts of labor 
inflows affect immigration policy. 
Fiscal distortions create an incentive for receiving countries to screen immigrants 
according to their perceived economic impact.  For high skilled immigrants, screening 
can be based on educational degrees and professional credentials, which are relatively 
easy to observe.  But for low skilled immigrants, screening is more problematic.  Their 
economic performance is based less on education than on motivation and ability, which 
are hard to verify in a visa application or a consular interview.  Having low skilled 
workers enter as illegal immigrants, as is increasingly the case not only in the United 
States but also in Europe, is a mechanism for selecting potential entrants who have a 
strong desire to work.  While illegal entry may help identify good workers, it has other 
properties that are unappealing, including exposing migrants to extreme physical risks, 
leaving immigrants in a state of prolonged uncertainty regarding their residency rights, 
and attracting criminal gangs into the business of migration.  In section five, I discuss 
why countries create separate policy regimes to govern legal and illegal immigration and 
identify mechanisms that could potentially replace illegal entry.   
 High-income countries maintain barriers to immigration not because of a lack of 
international cooperation but because they do not perceive significant benefits from 
greater labor inflows.  Ironically, the labor movements that make migrants substantially 
better off appear to have only modest effects on net incomes in receiving countries.  
Borjas (1999) estimates that for the United States the net short run impact from 
immigration is a change in GDP of a few tenths of a percent, which given the 
uncertainties involved in making such a calculation is essentially a wash.  While one may 
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quibble with some of the assumptions underlying his calculations, plausible alternative 
assumptions would not yield outcomes more than two or three times larger, which is still 
less than one percent of GDP.  For policy makers in labor-importing nations, the modest 
benefits freer immigration may bring are simply not worth the political hassle.  To induce 
high-income countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of the bargain.  
By way of conclusion, in section six I discuss policy reforms that could make receiving 
countries amenable to raising immigration from poor countries. 
 
2 INCOME GAINS FROM EMIGRATION 
How large are the gains in migrating from a low-income to a high-income 
country?  As an illustrative example, consider the income gain to migrating from Mexico 
to the United States.  One way to evaluate the gain would be to compare incomes for 
individuals in different countries with similar observable characteristics.  Using data from 
U.S. and Mexico population censuses, Hanson (2006) reports that in 2000 the average 
hourly wage for a 28 to 32 year old male with 9 to 11 years of education was $2.40 in 
Mexico and $8.70 for recent Mexican immigrants in the US.2
Yet, migrants and non-migrants with similar education and experience may not be 
  At full time labor supply 
(35 hours per week and 48 weeks per year) this would yield a yearly income gain of 
$10,600.  Combining household data in developing countries with data from the U.S. 
Census, Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) estimate that in 2000 the annual 
income gain to migration for a 35 year-old urban Mexican male with 9 to 12 years of 
education was $9,200.   
                                                 
2 Interestingly, for Mexico the relative income gain appears similar (about four times) whether one looks at 
per capita GDP or hourly wages for low skilled labor.  For other developing countries, per capita GDP 
differences overstate the relative gain to migration.  See Clemens et al. (2008). 
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the right comparison.  They may differ in terms of unobserved cognitive ability, motor 
skills, or motivation.  If migrants are positively selected on unobserved skill, the 
estimated $10,000 gain would overstate the benefits from emigration.  Clemens, 
Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) attempt to control for self-selection on unobservables in 
migration, as well as for the possibility that the gains to migration include compensation 
for the cost of moving abroad.  They find that observed gains to migration overstate true 
gains by 1.25 to 1.5 times.  For the Mexico-U.S. case, the gain to migration would fall 
from $10,000 to $6,700 to $8,000. 
The income gain from migration captures the gross return from moving to another 
country.  While there has been research on the role of migration networks in migration 
decisions, there is little work that estimates the actual cost of migration.  These costs 
include transport expenses in moving abroad, time lost in switching labor markets, 
administrative fees incurred in legal migration, border crossing costs in illegal migration, 
the psychic costs of leaving home, and perceived changes in uncertainty associated with 
living and working in another country.  Given the absence of comprehensive data on 
migration costs, we are far from being able to produce reliable estimates of the change in 
net income resulting from emigration.  The change in income from emigration is the 
monetary gain from moving between countries.  Through remittances, this gain is shared 
between the migrant and his or her family members at home.  Having migrants abroad 
also provides insurance to households, helping them smooth consumption in response to 
income shocks, be they domestic or foreign (Yang, 2007).  
 For labor exporting countries, the costs and benefits from emigration tend to be 
highly unequally distributed (Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007).  Most of the gain is captured 
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by migrants, a portion of which they share with their family members.  Non-migrating 
workers in sending countries may also gain, as wages rise in response to a reduction in 
labor supply (Mishra, 2007).  Yet, labor exporting countries are likely to suffer a 
reduction in GDP, given the loss of labor resources.  If the emigrating labor is highly 
skilled, there may also be negative consequences for economic growth (which could be 
ameliorated by emigration’s positive effect on the incentive to acquire skills; Docquier 
and Rapoport, 2008).  The end result of emigration is that, at least in the short run, a 
relatively small number of individuals may enjoy a substantial gain while a relatively 
large number may experience a moderate loss.  For sending countries, emigration tends to 
increase GNP (which in theory includes income earned by migrants) but to decrease GDP 
(Hanson, 2008).  Here, then, is an important difference between trade and international 
migration.  While in theory trade raises the GDP of all countries, international migration 
only raises the GDP of receiving countries.  In theory, migration does raise GNP for all 
countries, but if sending countries lack the means to tax emigrants, the value of their lost 
labor services may not be offset by the value of the income they remit. 
 
3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 Why do countries restrict immigration?  Absent distortions, the first-best policy 
for a labor-importing country would be to have open borders.  Yet, most developed 
countries are far from such a policy.  Immigration changes the distribution of income 
within a country, creating winners and losers.  In the United States, winners appear to 
include businesses that hire foreign labor, consumers that buy the goods and services that 
immigrants produce (Cortes, 2008), and land owners (Saiz, 2007); losers include low 
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skilled native workers that compete with immigrants for jobs (Borjas, 2003) and 
taxpayers that absorb the fiscal costs of immigration (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 
2008).  Evidence for Europe suggests that the labor market and fiscal consequences of 
immigration also contribute to opposition to foreign labor inflows (Mayda, 2006; 
Facchini and Mayda, 2008).   
By changing the income distribution, immigration has political consequences, 
which may give politicians an incentive to restrict labor inflows from abroad.  In 
choosing an immigration policy, a government trades off political support from special 
interests against consumer welfare, which tends to be enhanced by economic openness.  
Governments may restrict immigration because they weigh the welfare of different 
individuals unequally, for whatever reason favoring those opposed to immigration.  In the 
United States, fiscal conservatives have considerable political weight, given their 
prominence in the Republican Party.  Their opposition to immigration (in concert with 
cultural conservatives who also resist immigration) helped derail attempts to legalize 
illegal immigrants and expand visas for guest workers in 2007.  For fear of offending the 
party’s base, Republican presidential candidate John McCain, who had been a leading 
advocate for expanded immigration, gave the issue little attention in his 2008 campaign.  
In Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands, right wing 
parties have also been energized by immigration, allowing a core of anti-immigrant 
voters to have outsize influence in political outcomes. 
Lobbying by special interests may also influence immigration policy.  Facchini, 
Mayda and Mishra (2008) examine the allocation of foreign guest workers (in the form of 
H1B visas for skilled labor) across US industries and find that industries that spend more 
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on lobbying the government on immigration succeed in obtaining a larger number of 
visas.  Most H1B immigrants are in engineering, science or other technical fields, which 
have been in scare supply in the United States during the last two decades (Lowell, 
2000).  Lobbying activities are evidence that skilled immigration benefits employers, 
consistent with standard economic theory that inflows of labor raise the marginal product 
of capital.  In theory, skill-intensive industries are the ones that gain most from skilled 
immigration, consistent with their aggressive in lobbying for visas.  
For politicians to respond to pressure from voters regarding immigration policy, 
voters in destination countries must perceive that immigration affects their standard of 
living.  In the United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that opposition to 
immigration is stronger among less-educated workers, which appear to be the group most 
hurt by labor inflows from abroad (Borjas, 2003).  The opposition of the less-educated is 
greater in regions where immigrant inflows have been larger.  Less-skilled labor’s 
skepticism about immigration mirrors its opposition to globalization more generally 
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).  Mayda (2006) obtains similar results for a cross-section of 
European and Asian countries.  In economies where immigrants are less skilled than 
natives, opposition to immigration is stronger among less-skilled residents.  Still, one 
might be skeptical about the ability of low skilled labor to influence immigration policy.  
Low income workers tend to have relatively low voter participation rates, giving 
politicians an incentive to discount their concerns.   
 
4 FISCAL IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Tax and transfer policies create another motivation for a labor-importing country 
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to restrict immigration, even where the level of immigration is set by a social planner.  If 
immigrants are primarily individuals with low income relative to natives, increased labor 
inflows may exacerbate distortions created by social-insurance programs or means-tested 
entitlement programs (Wellisch and Walz, 1998).  Such policies may make a departure 
from free immigration the constrained social optimum.  In the long run, immigrants may 
also affect voting outcomes directly through their participation in the political process, 
possibly leading to a further transfer of income away from native taxpayers (Razin, 
Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Ortega, 2004). 
  In the United States, the fiscal consequences of immigration appear to matter for 
immigration policy preferences.  Low-skilled immigrants – who account for one-third of 
the U.S. foreign-born population – tend to earn relatively low wages, pay relatively little 
in taxes, and receive subsidized health care with relatively high frequency (Borjas and 
Hilton, 1996; Fix and Passel, 2002).  Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find that U.S. 
natives who are more exposed to immigrant fiscal pressures – those living in states that 
have large immigrant populations and that provide immigrants access to generous public 
benefits – are more in favor of reducing immigration.  This public-finance cleavage is 
strongest among natives with high earnings potential, who tend to be in higher tax 
brackets.  Facchini and Mayda (2008) obtain similar results for Europe, where 
immigrants also appear to be a fiscal drain (Sinn, Flaig, Werding, Munz and Hofmann, 
2003).  More educated individuals, who are also likely to be high income earners, are 
more opposed to immigration in countries where immigrants are less skilled and 
governments are more generous in the benefits they provide. 
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  There are also regional inequalities in the fiscal impacts of immigration.  These 
are particularly noticeable in the United States.  States and localities incur much of the 
fiscal cost associated with immigration, while the federal government receives much of 
the revenues (Hanson, 2006).  In the United States, states and localities pay for public 
education and public health, with support from the federal government in the form of 
block grants.  About half of the value of public services that immigrants absorb is in the 
form of publication education, with health care occupying the second category.  Much of 
the tax revenues from immigration, in contrast, go to the federal government.  While 
sales taxes and property taxes are captured by states and localities, payroll taxes and 
federal income taxes would go to Washington, DC.  Illegal immigrants often have payroll 
taxes withheld because they present Social Security cards to employers (be they real or 
fake) as proof of employability.  By law, U.S. employers are required to ask for 
documents proving the eligibility of an individual for employment but they are not 
required to go to great efforts to verify the authenticity of these documents.  As part of an 
accepted fiction in employing illegal immigrants, employers deduct payroll taxes from 
their paychecks and pay these to the federal government.  Contributions maid on behalf 
of invalid Social Security accounts go into the Earnings Suspense Fund, which as of 2007 
held $600 billion.  Many illegal immigrants pay federal income taxes, as well, as this 
creates a paper trail of their earnings which is useful for obtaining home loans and car 
loans from banks. 
How large are the net fiscal consequences of immigration in actuality?  The truth 
is we do not really know.  The vast majority of studies, including the analyses of 
immigration and public pensions discussed below, are calibration exercises based on 
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assumptions about future immigration and immigrant behavior.  One of the few 
comprehensive national level analyses of the fiscal impact of immigration was by the 
National Research Council (NRC).  For the United States, the NRC estimated that in 
1996 immigration imposed a short-run fiscal burden on the average U.S. native 
household of $200, or 0.2% of U.S. GDP.3
What about illegal immigrants?  Camarota (2004) applies the NRC methodology 
to estimate the fiscal impact of illegal immigration in the United States. He finds that in 
2002 US illegal immigrants on net received $10 billion more in government benefits than 
they paid in taxes, a value equal to 0.1% of US GDP in that year. With unauthorized 
immigrants accounting for 5% of the US labor force, US residents would receive a 
surplus from illegal immigration of about 0.03% of GDP.  Combining these two numbers, 
it appears that as of 2002 illegal immigration caused an annual income loss of 0.07% of 
US GDP.  Again, given the uncertainties surrounding this sort of calculation, one could 
not say with much confidence that this impact is different from zero. 
  In that year, the immigration surplus, as 
calculated by Borjas (1999), was 0.1% of GDP. A back of the envelope calculation then 
suggests that in the short run immigration in the mid-1990s reduced the annual income of 
U.S. residents by about 0.1% of GDP. Given the uncertainties involved in making this 
calculation, one should not put great stock in the fact that the resulting estimate is 
negative.  But the available evidence suggests the total impact is quite small. 
Pay as you go pension systems create a further incentive for politicians to 
manipulate the timing and level of immigration (Scholten and Thum, 1996; Razin and 
Sadka, 1999; Poutvaara, 2005).   Governments may choose to permit immigration of 
                                                 
3 Going from a short-run to a long-run estimate of the fiscal cost of immigration can change the results 
considerably.  See Borjas (1999). 
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young workers, in order to smooth adjustment to demographic shocks, such as the aging 
of the baby boom generation (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Storesletten, 2000).  
Given its graying population and unfunded pension liabilities, one might expect Europe 
to be opening itself more aggressively to foreign labor inflows (Boeri, McCormick, and 
Hanson, 2002).  However, concerns over possible increases in expenditure on social 
insurance programs may temper the region’s enthusiasm for using immigration to solve 
its pension problems (Boeri and Brücker, 2005; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2006).   
Beyond the economic consequences of labor inflows, some argue that opposition 
to immigration is grounded in culture, with individuals preferring homogenous societies 
because they foster a stronger sense of national identity and civic purpose (Huntington, 
2005).  Consistent with this claim, the recent anti-immigration-based presidential 
campaigns of Pauline Hanson in Australia, Jean Marie Le Pen in France, and Tom 
Tancredo and Duncan Hunter in the United States each touted the negative cultural 
effects of foreign labor inflows.   Because fiscal conservatives and cultural conservatives 
are often aligned politically, it is difficult to disentangle how important cultural attitudes 
are in promoting resistance to immigration.   
 
5 THE DESIGN OF IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES 
 Because immigration may create tension with the functioning of the welfare state, 
high income democratic countries – all of which have welfare systems of one kind or 
another – may resist the unfettered inflow of foreign labor.  One solution to the conflict 
would be to deny immigrants access to welfare benefits, which would allow receiving 
countries to gain from labor inflows while not exacerbating fiscal distortions too 
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severely.  Guest worker programs in part serve this purpose.  They grant foreign workers 
admission visas, while restricting their residency rights by placing limits on the amount 
of time they can spend in the country and the public services to which they have access.  
Yet, in most countries, guest worker programs remain small.  In the United States, 
temporary immigrants accounted for only 3% of the total stock of immigrants in the 
country in 2005 (Camarota, 2005).  In 2006, inflows of legal temporary workers were 
213,000 in Australia, 146,000 in Canada, 28,000 in France, 295,000 in Germany, 98,000 
in Italy, 164,000 in Japan, 83,000 in the Netherlands, and 266,000 in the United Kingdom 
(OECD, 2008).  Note that given the short term status of guest workers these numbers 
represents stocks and not flows of temporary immigrants (i.e., these populations of 
workers turn over completely every one to three years).   
Interestingly, it is non-democratic countries, including the Gulf States, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, that appear to channel most of their low-skilled immigrants 
through guest worker programs (Rupert, 1999; Winckler, 1999).  Table 2 shows the stock 
of immigrants in 2000 in the six largest Middle Eastern labor importing countries, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.4
                                                 
4 While immigrants accounts for a large share of the populations of Hong Kong and Singapore, labor 
inflows into these countries are a small share of the world total (with the exception of migration from China 
to Hong Kong, which totals 2.2 million individuals).  In 2000, the number of non-Chinese immigrants in 
Hong Kong and Singapore were just over a half a million individuals in each country (Parsons et al., 2007). 
  In 2000, 
immigration in these countries accounted for 6.4% of the world total and 7.5% of world 
immigration from low and middle income countries.  Two thirds of the immigration in 
the six Gulf States comes from just seven sending countries, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen.   
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Why would Gulf States be willing to admit large numbers of low skilled 
immigrants as guest workers whereas the United States and Europe effectively force 
similar labor inflows to be illegal?  One conjecture is that non-democratic countries are 
better able to enforce the departure provisions of guest worker contracts (Massey, 2004).  
The Gulf States do appear to be aggressive in deporting illegal immigrants (Shah, 2006).  
Enforcing departure requires immigration authorities to be able to monitor the 
movements of immigrants.   A government cannot deport immigrants that violate the 
terms of their visas unless it can locate them.  Monitoring may be aided by the internal 
surveillance that non-democratic countries maintain as part of their national security 
infrastructure.  Tight internal security may make it difficult for illegal immigrants to 
evade apprehension.  The watchful eye of the government may thus enhance the 
capability of the state to run large scale temporary immigration programs. 
Relative to non-democratic societies, democratic countries are typically less 
vigilant over the movements of individuals.  The protection of civil liberties inherent to 
democratic societies may complicate the internal enforcement of temporary immigration 
visas (Martin, 2001).   Concerns over violating civil liberties may impede the state from 
acquiring information over where immigrants live and work.  If immigrants in democratic 
countries choose to overstay their visas and violate the terms of their temporary labor 
contracts, they often can (Passel, 2006).  One consequence of imperfect vigilance in 
democracies may be that voters are skeptical about the ability of governments to force 
temporary migrants to return home after their labor contracts are completed.  Imperfect 
enforcement of guest worker contracts for low skilled immigrants may lead voters to 
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view such programs as simply allowing open ended immigration, causing them to have 
weak political support (Briggs, 2004). 
 How do democratic receiving countries resolve the conflict between the welfare 
state and the need for immigration?  One way is by effectively forcing low skilled foreign 
workers to enter their countries as illegal immigrants.  Illegal immigration gives receiving 
countries access to the labor they desire, while limiting the fiscal consequences of labor 
inflows.  In the United States, illegal immigrants account for 30% of the foreign born 
population in the country (Passel, 2006).  Illegal immigration is by no means exclusively 
a US phenomenon.  For the European Union, Jandl (2003) estimates than the gross 
annual inflow of illegal immigrants is on the order of 650,000 to 800,000 individuals a 
year, which is comparable to gross illegal inflows in the United States.  Inflows of this 
magnitude do not necessarily translate into large stocks of illegal immigrants in part 
because European countries have been aggressive in providing amnesties to illegal 
immigrants.  Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have each offered multiple amnesties, 
which has kept the share of illegals in the region’s foreign born population under 10% 
(Jandl, 2003).   
While the United States and Europe devote resources to enforcing their borders 
against illegal immigration, it is evident that these enforcement efforts are not meant to 
be too effective.  The United States spends about $15 billion a year on border 
enforcement efforts and apprehends 0.8 to 1.2 million individuals attempting to enter the 
country illegally (Hanson, 2006).  In the European Union, there are no official data on 
spending on border enforcement or on the number of illegal immigrants detained but 
Jandl (2003) suggests that there are at least 0.3 to 0.4 million apprehensions of illegal 
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immigrants in EU countries each year.  The United States and Europe could easily afford 
to spend far more on border enforcement but choose not to.  High levels of illegal 
immigration reflect a decision on the part of receiving country governments to allow 
illegal entry to occur.  Illegal immigration is a policy choice.   
 To understand why countries permit both legal and illegal immigration it is 
helpful to review the mechanisms that countries use to govern admissions.  Countries 
regulate legal immigration through a combination of numerical quotas, entry selection 
criteria, and restrictions on residency rights.  While many countries have admission 
categories that allow unrestricted immigration, these are generally limited to immediate 
family members of citizens, as in the United States, or individuals from countries within 
an economic bloc, as in the European Union.  Other legal immigrants are subject to 
quotas, whose number varies according to a nation’s ex ante selection criteria.  The 
United States allocates the majority of permanent residence visas to relatives of U.S. 
citizens and legal residents; Australia and Canada favor legal immigrants that meet 
designated skill criteria; and many European countries reserve a large share of visas for 
refugees and asylees (OECD, 2008).  Visas come with limited residency rights.  
Temporary visas specify a time limit for residence, the types of jobs a visa holder may 
hold, and the set of government benefits to which the holder has access.  Permanent visas 
provide broader residency rights, such as mobility between employers and access to more 
government benefits, but do not always offer a clear path to citizenship. 
 Regarding illegal immigration, while countries do not explicitly set unauthorized 
labor inflows, they do implicitly determine the ease of illegal entry through their 
enforcement actions.  By choosing the intensity with which they police national borders 
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and monitor domestic worksites, governments influence the smuggling fee illegal 
immigrants pay to enter a country (Ethier, 1986; Gathmann, 2004).  Enforcement also 
defines an ex post selection criterion for illegal immigrants:  individuals who are able to 
evade capture by avoiding the police earn the right to stay in the country (Cox and 
Posner, 2006).  The United States, for instance, concentrates enforcement on borders 
rather than in the interior, allowing most illegal immigrants who do not commit crimes or 
maintain a high public profile to remain on U.S. soil (Davila, Pagan, and Grau, 1999).  
While illegal immigrants lack official residency rights, they are not devoid of legal 
protections.  Again in the United States, illegal immigrants may report crimes, attend 
public schools, seek emergency medical services, obtain bank loans, or even acquire a 
driver’s license (in some states), with minimal risk of deportation. 
 For migrants, there are obvious disadvantages associated with high-income 
countries channeling the low skilled through illegal means of entry.  Illegal migration is 
dangerous, subjecting migrants to physical risks associated entry by sea, across deserts, 
or hidden in transport vehicles.  To reduce physical risks, migrants often seek the services 
of a smuggler, but this entails risks of its own associated with robbery or assault.  Once in 
the destination country, being illegal leaves migrants in a state of uncertainty and 
weakens their ability and incentive to make long run investments in their place of 
residence.  By virtue of their status, illegal immigrants lack legal recourse and may be 
apprehensive to seek police or fire protection when the situation calls. 
 Cross-country differences in policy regimes do not affect the skill mix of 
immigrants as much as one might think.  Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) find that 
excluding immigrants from Latin America – who benefit from close proximity to the 
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United States – the education, English fluency, and income of immigrants in Australia, 
Canada, and the United States are relatively similar.  This is true despite Australia’s and 
Canada’s use of a point system that favors skilled immigrants and the US reliance on 
family reunification, which takes no account of skill, for the majority of its admissions.  
Comparing immigrants admitted on employment-based visas in Australia and the United 
States, Jasso and Rosenzweig (2007) suggest that it is self-selection, rather than national 
screening mechanisms, which accounts for differences in immigrant skills. 
Even with similarities between countries in who gets in, there are differences 
within countries in how legal and illegal inflows are regulated.  As discussed above, 
authorized entrants tend to be subject to quantity regulation and ex ante selection criteria 
and have either expansive residency rights (for permanent immigrants) or limited 
residency rights (for temporary immigrants); and unauthorized entrants tend to be subject 
to price regulation and ex post selection criteria and have minimal residency rights. 
Why do countries permit both legal and illegal immigration?  First, consider legal 
inflows.  Quantity regulation allows a country to achieve specific goals in admissions, by 
assigning quotas to particular categories.  The allocation of quotas may reflect a desire to 
maximize the immigration surplus (by admitting scarce labor types), political economy 
constraints on the level and type of immigrant inflows, or other objectives of government 
(e.g., national security, cultural homogeneity, humanitarian concerns).  An ex ante screen 
has a cost in that the government foregoes the option to obtain information on an 
immigrant beyond observable characteristics, before offering admission (Cox and Posner, 
2006).  However, the cost of foregone information may be small for skilled immigrants 
whose abilities are verifiable in the form of educational degrees, professional awards, and 
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past employment positions.  The effective information cost may also be small where 
countries have strong preferences for specific types of entrants (e.g., family members), in 
which case any updating on immigrant quality after residence in the country would be 
unlikely to alter the admission decision.   
Combining an ex ante screen with broad residency rights gives immigrants a 
strong incentive to assimilate.  However, broad rights have a high fiscal cost, since they 
give immigrants access to government benefits.  The cost of providing broad rights may 
be small for skilled immigrants, whose income-earning ability would make them net 
contributors to government coffers.  For family-based immigrants, the perceived cost of 
broad rights may also be small since, as family members of residents, their well being 
may be an implicit component of national welfare.  For refugees and asylees, a similar 
logic would not apply, perhaps accounting for why they tend to have narrow residency 
rights (Åslund, Edin, and Fredriksson, 2001; Hatton and Williamson, 2004). 
Quotas do not imply as much inflexibility in immigration levels as it would seem, 
since countries often admit a mix of permanent and temporary entrants.  Opponents to 
immigration may be unwilling to allow all entrants be permanent.  Temporary 
immigration quotas give politicians the power to rescind visas in the future, which may 
increase support for immigration.  The cost of having immigrants be temporary is a weak 
incentive to assimilate.  Comparing the costs and benefits, we might expect the share of 
temporary immigrants in legal admissions to be higher when an economy is closer to a 
business cycle peak, at which point the option value of being able to expel current 
entrants in the future may be relatively high. 
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 For illegal immigration, entry prices and selection criteria are defined implicitly 
through the intensity of border and interior enforcement (Either, 1986).  Entry prices 
serve as selection device, since an individual must value migration to be willing to incur 
the cost of paying a smuggler.  Entry fees thus select immigrants with large perceived 
income gains (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2001), which would include those for whom 
immigration would yield large gains in either pre-tax income (due to a productivity gain 
from immigration) or post-tax income (due to tax and transfer policies in the destination).  
While most destination countries would prefer to attract the first type of immigrant over 
the second, an entry price does not select between the two. 
One way to encourage immigration of more productive illegal immigrants is 
through granting narrow residency rights.  For instance, since 1996 non-citizens in the 
United States have been ineligible for most types of federally funded public assistance 
(Fix and Passel, 2002).  A second way is through ex post screening.  Interior enforcement 
helps screen out illegal immigrants who commit crimes, try to obtain government 
benefits illicitly, or engage in other behavior deemed objectionable.  Governments that 
choose not to monitor employers that hire illegal immigrants can ensure that illegals who 
come to work are able remain in the country.  In the United States, greater border 
enforcement does not appear to have strong deterrent effects on illegal entry (Davila, 
Pagan, and Soydemir, 2002) or to affect wages or employment in U.S. border cities 
(Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo, 2001), suggesting that the primary role of 
enforcement is not to disrupt U.S. labor markets. 
Combining price regulation, narrow residency rights, and an ex post screen helps 
countries attract productive and motivated illegal immigrants.  This selection process may 
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be particularly important for the low-skilled, whose observable characteristics may be 
uninformative about their productivity.  In the United States, two-thirds of immigrants 
with less than a high school education appear to be in the country illegally (Passel, 2006), 
suggesting that the majority of the least skilled immigrants are unauthorized.  Relative to 
similarly skilled natives, low-skill immigrants have high employment rates and low rates 
of participation in crime (Butcher and Piehl, 1998 and 2006). 
 The United States and the EU have considered using expanded temporary 
immigration to absorb their illegal immigrant populations (Walmsley and Winters, 2005; 
Schiff, 2007).  Large scale illegal entry in the United States began after the end of the 
Bracero Program (1942-1964), which admitted large numbers of seasonal laborers from 
Mexico and the Caribbean to work on U.S. farms (Calavita, 1992).  Could new guest 
worker programs end illegal inflows?  Recent literature suggests that unless interior 
enforcement is highly effective at preventing employers from hiring illegals, a guest 
worker program that rations entry would not curtail the employment of unauthorized 
labor but simply push these workers deeper into the underground economy (Djajic, 1999; 
Epstein, Hillman, and Weiss, 1999; Epstein and Weiss, 2001). 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
 In a neoclassical economy, the optimal immigration policy would be to allow the 
unfettered entry of labor from abroad.  Yet, labor-importing countries tightly restrict 
labor inflows.  Barriers to immigration in part reflect domestic political opposition to 
open borders, with those most opposed to labor inflows being the workers and taxpayers 
who are most exposed to the adverse consequences of immigration on labor markets and 
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fiscal accounts.  Immigration barriers may also represent a second-best policy that 
governments adopt in order not to exacerbate distortions associated with domestic social-
insurance programs that they are unwilling to dismantle. 
 The structure of immigration policy regimes suggests that destination countries 
also use barriers to identify individuals who appear likely to be productive workers 
and/or have the desire to assimilate.  Reserving immigration visas for skilled workers 
selects high ability foreigners in a transparent manner.  Restricting the residency rights of 
immigrants helps screen out those whose primary interest is in enjoying rich-country 
welfare benefits.  Less transparently, barriers to illegal immigration also select the more 
productive and more motivated workers among the low-skilled, whose ability is hard to 
observe.  The existence of informational problems in evaluating immigrants’ abilities and 
motivations suggests there may be gains from coordination between labor-exporting and 
labor-importing countries.  Were labor-importing countries to have access to better 
information on the employment histories of low-skilled individuals in developing 
countries, they might be willing to accept them in larger numbers and require fewer of 
them to enter their economies as illegal immigrants. 
 There would appear to be strong efficiency arguments for having high income 
countries admit more immigrants.  Their unwillingness to do so reflects an estimation that 
the gains from higher immigration are not worth the political and fiscal costs.  There 
would also appear to be efficiency gains associated with converting illegal immigrants 
into legal immigrants.  Legality would reduce the uncertainty and physical risk that are 
inherent to unauthorized migration, increase the incentive of migrants to make 
investments in human or physical capital, diminish the scope for criminal gangs to 
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capture a portion of the gains to migration, and strengthen the rule of law in receiving 
countries.  The challenge in converting illegal immigrants into legal immigrants – in 
terms of maintaining domestic political support for such a policy – is avoiding making 
fiscal distortions in receiving countries worse. 
Given the absence of an incentive for receiving countries to participate in 
multilateral negotiations on immigration barriers, efforts to reform immigration policies 
will have to come from receiving countries themselves.  What measures would encourage 
individuals and governments in receiving countries to accept higher levels of legal 
immigration from low income countries? 
• Have employers internalize the fiscal cost of hiring immigrant workers. 
One source of opposition to immigration is that it results in a net fiscal transfer 
from native households to immigrant households, at least in cases where immigrants have 
low income levels relative to natives (under the assumption that the receiving country tax 
system is progressive).  Low skilled immigration thus imposes a negative pecuniary 
externality on native taxpayers in the form of a higher net tax burden.  Employers in 
receiving countries would make efficient choices regarding the employment of immigrant 
workers if they had to internalize the fiscal cost.    
• Create an incentive for employers to hire legal immigrants.  
To convert current and future illegal immigrants into legal immigrants requires 
changing the incentives for employers in receiving countries.  For employers, one key 
change is ending their ability to hire illegal immigrants under the guise of legal 
employment, as currently occurs in the United States.  This could be achieved by having 
a national identification card, as exists in some European countries, or by imposing a 
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mandatory verification system for employment eligibility.  The United States has 
developed an electronic system known as E-Verify, in which prospective employees have 
their documents checked against a government database.  As it stands, verification is 
mandatory only for government contractors and a few select types of other firms.  
Making electronic verification mandatory for all firms would end the ability of employers 
to plausibly deny that they have knowingly hired illegal immigrants.  Verification would 
make monitoring of employers a much more significant deterrent against violating 
employment regulations.   
A second key change is making employment visas available in sufficient quantity.  
One appeal of hiring illegal immigrants is that they are available immediately, with their 
numbers fluctuating over the course of the business cycle.  One way to make visas 
responsive to market conditions is to auction their supply (Freeman, 2006).  Were 
governments to set a target price for visas, they could vary the supply to keep the visa 
price relatively constant.  The sale of visas would generate revenue for receiving 
countries, transferring a portion of the gains from migration from migrants to the host 
country.  Capturing these gains would encourage receiving countries to raise immigration 
of low skilled individuals beyond current levels. 
While auctioning visas might appear to be a significant change in how receiving 
countries govern legal immigration, recall that regimes governing illegal immigration are 
already price regulated.  Smugglers charge fees to migrants to enter receiving countries 
illegally, with the fee reflecting demand for entry (rising during relative boom periods in 
the receiving country) and the cost of illegal crossing (rising during periods of more 
intense border enforcement by the receiving country).  Auctioning visas would allow 
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receiving countries to capture revenues currently enjoyed by smugglers.  Migrants would 
go from paying smugglers a fee for an uncertain entry outcome to paying a fee for a 
certain entry outcome, arguably improving their welfare even if the entry price rises. 
• Create an incentive for migrants to work as legal employees. 
For migrants, the imposition of a payroll tax and the auctioning of visas could 
create an incentive for them to eschew legal employment and seek work in the 
underground economy as unauthorized employees.  While mandatory verification and 
monitoring of employers would dissuade many firms from hiring illegal immigrants, not 
all firms would be deterred.  Migrants would also need incentives to operate in the legal 
economy.  One incentive is the promise of permanent residence and citizenship.  Suppose 
that migrants could accumulate points toward obtaining a permanent residence visa by 
obtaining and completing satisfactorily a series of temporary employment visas.  
Migrants would have an incentive to comply with the requirements of a temporary visa if 
they wanted to get their visa renewed at the end of the visa period.  These requirements 
would include working in the receiving country only with a valid employment visa, 
paying all relevant payroll taxes, and not using public services for which temporary 
immigrants are ineligible (e.g., in the United States, non-citizens are ineligible for 
federally funded income support payments).  After a specified number of temporary visa 
renewals, an immigrant would be eligible for permanent residence and, after a specified 
waiting period, citizenship, brining full residency rights.  Such a system of graduated 
residency rights (going from an initial temporary visa to a renewed temporary visa to 
permanent residence to citizenship) would provide a strong incentive for migrants to play 
by the rules.  Citizenship would be conditional on behavior.  Illegal migrants would 
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progress from the current environment of vague promises of permanent residence in 
return for their working hard and staying out of trouble to a system where the rewards to 
compliance are well defined and subject to low risk. 
• Create screening mechanisms for low skilled immigrant workers. 
One of the appealing features of illegal immigration is that it attracts individuals 
with a strong desire to work.  By virtue of having to pay an entry fee and not having 
access to a safety net, illegal immigrants are highly motivated to stay employed.  The 
challenge for policy makers is to replicate these features through a system of legal 
migration.  One way to accomplish this would be by allowing international employment 
agencies to matching workers in sending countries with employers in receiving countries.  
Employment agencies would serve as intermediaries, obtaining information on the skill 
profile and work history of prospective migrants and the occupational requirements of 
employers.  Employment agencies have come to play a large role in domestic hiring by 
firms in high income countries, particularly the United States (Autor, 2008).  In the 
Philippines, such agencies help place workers in construction jobs in Gulf States and 
domestic service jobs in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The active market for illegal labor in the United States and Europe may have 
reduced the scope for legal intermediaries.  Since legal intermediaries risk fines or 
imprisonment by taking illegal immigrants as clients, their incentive to enter the market is 
limited.  Perhaps as a consequence, employers primarily use informal networks to find 
workers, relying on their employees to recruit friends and relatives from sending 
countries (Massey et al., 1994).  Such networks serve a useful purpose but by their nature 
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are small in scale.  Converting illegal immigrants into legal immigrants would potentially 
increase the demand for formal intermediaries to help employers find workers abroad. 
Screening mechanisms should not rely on sending countries to be gatekeepers for 
emigration.  Were sending country governments given the power to select which 
individuals would obtain visas to work abroad, the incentive for corruption would be 
great.  Initially, the Bracero Program had the Mexican government allocating visas to 
migrants to work in the United States (Calavita, 1992).  Rampant corruption and abuse of 
workers put an end to this.  U.S. employers then began to contract directly with Mexican 
workers (often using their own recruiters to find field hands). 
 
Allowing more labor to move from low income countries to high income 
countries would raise world income, generating gains for migrants, migrant family 
members in sending countries, and receiving countries.  Receiving countries remain 
unenthusiastic about immigration because they enjoy, at best, small net gains from 
international labor flows.  Migrants capture much of the gains from international 
migration.  Whatever benefits that remain for receiving countries are partially or fully 
negated by worsening fiscal distortions.  Unless receiving countries perceive greater 
benefits from immigration, they will not be inclined to allow more labor in.   
Multilateral negotiations hold little hope for expanding labor flows.  At least as 
far as migration is concerned, receiving countries have all the bargaining power.  
Reciprocal market access for migration to poor sending countries is simply not much of 
an attraction for the United States or Europe.  The WTO itself acknowledges that GATS 
Mode IV has been ineffective at increasing global labor flows (IOM/World Bank/WTO, 
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Mamdouh, 2004).  Making Mode IV a meaningful vehicle for migration would appear to 
require governments to substantially liberalize their commitments on labor movements 
associated with trade in services.  High-income countries do not appear to have made this 
a priority in their approach to negotiations surrounding the Doha Round (Charlton and 
Stiglitz, 2005).  Conceivably, low-income countries could demand progress on expanding 
Mode IV as grounds for completing Doha.  Given the existing conflicts and controversy 
surrounding the negotiations, it is difficult to see how such an approach would make 
completing the round more likely. 
Fortunately, there are changes that receiving countries could undertake 
themselves that would encourage the lowering of immigration barriers.  The fiscal costs 
of immigration could be reduced by subjecting immigrant workers to payroll taxes and by 
auctioning visas to temporary immigrant workers.  With more visas available and in 
flexible supply, the incentive for illegal migration would fall.  Sensible monitoring of 
employers could further reduce the hiring of illegal labor.  Migrants could also gain from 
such reforms, to the extent they obtained a clearly defined path to citizenship and were 
able to escape the risk uncertainty of unauthorized migration.  New individuals in low 
income countries could possibly gain access to emigration opportunities.  Simply stated, 
unless they perceive larger benefits to immigration, receiving countries are unlikely to 
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   Table 1    
 Stocks of International Migrants by Origin and Destination Region, 2000  
  Destination Region 
Origin Region High Income Other Asia  







& N. Africa 
Sub Saharan 
Africa Total 
High Income 21,155,815 1,149,869 2,036,010 553,633 478,763 1,246,442 772,836 27,393,368 
Other Asia  15,266,768 18,104,219 174,503 126,806 368,003 9,397,668 411,041 43,849,008 
Latin America & Car. 21,453,599 622,774 3,575,082 60,829 249,683 452,855 237,676 26,652,498 
Eastern Europe 6,913,603 198,836 79,468 1,689,382 832,362 1,269,960 162,681 11,146,292 
Former Soviet Union 2,252,041 674,546 69,594 1,650,766 24,553,428 1,612,173 411,628 31,224,176 
Mid. East & N. Africa 9,161,003 461,413 93,889 276,559 247,622 7,118,225 531,322 17,890,033 
Sub Saharan Africa 3,901,407 302,209 41,135 63,436 138,666 798,755 12,307,038 17,552,646 
Total 80,104,236 21,513,866 6,069,681 4,421,411 26,868,527 21,896,078 14,834,222 175,708,021 
         
 International Migrants by Origin and Destination Region as Share of World Total, 2000  
  Destination Region 
Origin Region High Income Other Asia  







& N. Africa 
Sub Saharan 
Africa Total 
High Income 0.120 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.156 
Other Asia  0.087 0.103 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.053 0.002 0.250 
Latin America & Car. 0.122 0.004 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.152 
Eastern Europe 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.063 
Former Soviet Union 0.013 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.140 0.009 0.002 0.178 
Mid. East & N. Africa 0.052 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.041 0.003 0.102 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.070 0.100 
  0.456 0.122 0.035 0.025 0.153 0.125 0.084 1.000 
High income includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand; Canada, the United States; Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Data are from Parsons et al. (2007). 
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Other Asia 191,059 848,149 395,614 580,034 409,388 2,929,055 1,485,422 6,838,721  
Indonesia      296,778 13,098 355,955  
Philippines      383,031 18,551 486,521  
Bangladesh    111,968  379,207 24,041 614,611  
India 146,512 362,591 219,184 341,342 409,388 1,045,985 1,299,439 3,824,441  
Pakistan      661,383  881,854  
         
Middle East, N. Africa 30,797 516,591 87,011 72,538 0 1,967,811 214,235 2,888,983  
Yemen      360,438  424,900  
Egypt  127,018    1,015,124  1,248,258  
         
High Income 4,469 134,300 147,698 12,308 0 53,643 51,441 403,859  
Eastern Europe 1,424 120,194 58,854 756 0 1,266 46,039 228,533  
Former Soviet Union 18,393 177,372 179,148 2,329 0 1,865 67,941 447,048  
Latin America, Caribbean 2,884 74,713 152,289 182 0 785 28,619 259,472  
Sub Saharan Africa 5,281 73,897 87,060 13,574 0 300,387 28,304 508,503  
         
Total 254,307 1,945,216 1,107,674 681,721 409,388 5,254,812 1,922,001 11,575,119  
 
This table shows the stock of immigrants in Gulf States by sending region and for the largest sending countries.  Data are from 
Parsons et al. (2007). 
